The links between ETA and the Sumud Flotilla: a pattern that repeats

The Sumud flotilla is not an isolated episode. It is the most recent expression of a network of complicity between Palestinian terrorism and violent Basque separatism that has been operating for more than four decades — with the same ideological substrate, the same support circuits, and the same permissiveness from the Sánchez Government.

THE HISTORICAL LINK

● The PFLP trained ETA. In 1980, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) instructed a dozen ETA members in a training camp in Yemen for 60 days. The commandos learned how to handle automatic weapons and mortars. The contact was arranged by Josu Ternera — the most wanted ETA terrorist in the history of Spain.

● A documented and verified collaboration. The source: the doctoral thesis of researcher Florencio Domínguez (UPV-EHU), “ETA: Organizational Strategy and Actions 1978-1992”. Four of the ETA members who participated — José Manuel Arzalluz Eguiguren, Juan Ignacio Urrutibeascoa, José Antonio Aguirrebarrena and Juan Carlos Yurrebaso Atutxa — were arrested in Amsterdam by Dutch police upon their return from Yemen. The rest joined commands such as Araba, Goierri and Donosti — some of the bloodiest in ETA’s history.

● The PFLP: a recognized terrorist organization. It is classified as a terrorist organization by the European Union, the United States and Canada. Its record includes plane hijackings, grenade attacks on Israeli embassies, and incidents on Spanish soil: the assault on the Egyptian embassy in Madrid (1975) and the murder of a PFLP correspondent in Madrid (1982).

● In 2024, the PFLP marched in Madrid. The same group took part in a pro-Palestinian demonstration in Madrid authorized by the Government Delegation. Youth Minister Sira Rego marched behind their banners. Israel formally requested that the Government take action. The Government did not respond.

● The link is not only historical: Samidoun visited the PFLP in 2021. In July 2021, a Samidoun delegation — the network behind the Sumud flotilla — traveled to Lebanon, visited the PFLP offices and paid tribute to its terrorists. Samidoun is sanctioned as a terrorist organization by the US and Canada, and was outlawed in Germany in 2023. The ETA-PFLP connection is not political archaeology: it is a living network that in 2026 organized 22 boats to Gaza.

● Saif Abu Keshek: Spanish citizen sanctioned by the US Treasury. The main coordinator of the flotilla holds a Spanish passport and was sanctioned by the US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) on May 19, 2026 as a member of the General Secretariat of the PCPA — an organization designated as terrorist by the Treasury for financing Hamas and by Israel since 2021. Documents captured from Hamas in Gaza identify him as operative number 25 of the PCPA in Spain. He is the link that unites the flotilla, the PFLP and the network that trained ETA.

THE SAME STRUCTURE

● The same monitors, with ETA convictions. In the 2026 flotilla, José Javier Oses participated; he was convicted in France to eight years in prison for belonging to ETA — and was one of the four arrested at Loiu airport upon return. In the 2025 flotilla, Itziar Moreno participated; she was sentenced to 15 years in prison for shooting and wounding a French gendarme, also for links to ETA, and was welcomed at Loiu with cheers and Palestinian flags. These are not “links with the Basque independence movement”: these are final convictions for terrorism, in two consecutive editions of the same flotilla. (Source: EFE, May 26, 2026.)

● At the service of victimhood. The manual is literal. In the “detainees’ manual” seized in the police operation against the Araba commando (1998) and confirmed in the judicial summary of Gestoras Pro Amnistía, ETA ordered its militants to systematically denounce torture after any arrest — regardless of whether it had occurred. The instruction was explicit: always denounce, against all possible agents, and “use your imagination”. Gestoras Pro Amnistía was the visible arm of that system: it activated the complaint, amplified it and delivered it to friendly media. The organizers of the Sumud flotilla have followed this same protocol with millimeter precision: before setting sail they already had the narrative of “brutality” and “piracy” prepared; as soon as Israel intercepted the boats, friendly channels spread it as proven fact. The incident is manufactured to be exploited. The narrative precedes the fact.

● The same street pressure. The day after the incidents at Loiu (May 23, 2026), a demonstration was called in Bilbao under the slogan: “Ertzaintza and Basque Government complicit with Israel. Destroy Zionism, free Palestine.” This is not an isolated case: in the days prior, a mob tried to storm the Arriaga Theater in Bilbao to boycott the performance of the Israeli company Hofesh Shechter. The pattern — Israeli interception or presence, network alert, immediate street pressure — exactly reproduces the mobilization structure that the ETA environment activated with every arrest of its militants. The same mechanism, the same networks, four decades later.

● The same dependence on totalitarian regimes. ETA was financed and trained with the support of Libya, Cuba, Sandinista Nicaragua and the USSR — regimes that provided training camps, weapons and diplomatic cover. Hamas depends on Iran, which according to the US Department of the Treasury transfers between 100 and 200 million dollars annually, and on Qatar, which hosts its political leadership. The Sumud flotilla raised more than 4 million euros in crowdfunding campaigns coordinated from Spain, through organizations such as the Intersindical Alternativa de Catalunya (IAC), of which Abu Keshek was a member of the board of directors. In both cases — ETA and Hamas — without external sponsorship, terrorism would not have sustained operational capacity. The network does not disappear with the organization: it reconfigures itself.

THE POLITICAL CONNIVANCE

● The Security Counselor defends the activists against his own police. Bingen Zupiria, Basque Security Counselor, appeared before the Basque Parliament to lament the incidents at Loiu and describe the Ertzaintza’s police action as “provocations”. He did so after one of the activists — José Javier Oses, convicted in France to eight years in prison for belonging to ETA — pushed and struck an officer, which triggered the police charge. A public security official apologized for the actions of his own police following an incident started by a convicted terrorist. The Ertzaintza officers deserve, in any case, the recognition that their counselor denied them.

● Sumar, Podemos and Bildu use Parliament to give a platform to someone sanctioned by the US Treasury. After the interception of the flotilla, Sumar, ERC, Bildu, Podemos, BNG and Compromís jointly requested the appearance in Congress of Saif Abu Keshek — designated a terrorist by the US Department of the Treasury on May 19, 2026 — so that he could recount his detention. In parallel, Sumar, ERC and Bildu requested the appearance of Minister Albares to explain the measures taken after what they called the “kidnapping” of the flotilla. EH Bildu demanded the immediate release of those detained at Loiu. Podemos Euskadi condemned the Ertzaintza charges. Sumar Mugimendua described them as “intolerable”. Three parties with parliamentary representation put their institutions at the service of the narrative of a network sanctioned by Washington. (Sources: EFE Agency; Infobae, May 13 and 21, 2026.)

● Sánchez removes ETA from the EU terrorist list and demands the release of the flotilla coordinator. In January 2026, the Government agreed with Bildu not to renew ETA’s presence on the EU list of terrorist organizations — a list on which ETA had appeared since 2001, after 9/11, and which is reviewed every six months. The same Government that that same week did nothing to prevent the inclusion of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard on that list refused to renew ETA’s: 800 murders, thousands injured, 376 unsolved crimes, and no ETA member who has collaborated with justice. Victims’ associations — AVT, Dignity and Justice — described it as a betrayal. In that same period, Minister Albares exerted diplomatic pressure to demand the release of Saif Abu Keshek, flotilla coordinator, legally detained by Israel and sanctioned by the US Treasury for financing terrorism.

● Public subsidies and financial opacity. Organizations identified in the ecosystem supporting the flotilla have received public subsidies for years. NGO Monitor identifies the Basque Government as the public institution that has granted the most subsidies in Europe to Addameer — an NGO formally designated by the US Department of the Treasury in June 2025 for acting on behalf of the PFLP, with 15 members of its board having documented links to that terrorist organization. Verifiable transfers from public sources of the Basque Government itself include €150,000 (2021) and an additional €78,000 via eLankidetza, plus hundreds of thousands more through intermediaries such as Mundubat. The city councils of Vitoria-Gasteiz and Donostia also funded Addameer directly. The total estimated since 2014: at least 6 million euros to Palestinian NGOs with documented links to the PFLP. No Spanish authority has opened an investigation. Anti-money laundering regulations require justifying the origin of the money in transactions of this scale. The question is how much longer the Government can ignore that legal obligation.

THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSIBILITY

The US confirms what Spain denies. On May 19, 2026, the US Department of the Treasury (OFAC) sanctioned Saif Abu Keshek — a Spanish citizen and coordinator of the Sumud flotilla — as a member of the General Secretariat of the PCPA, an organization designated as terrorist by the Treasury for financing Hamas and by Israel since 2021. The same network that connects the flotilla with the PFLP — the group that trained ETA in Yemen — has been identified and sanctioned by Washington. Meanwhile, the Sánchez Government sent Minister Albares to request his release.

Four questions that the Sánchez Government has not answered:

1. How did Saif Abu Keshek obtain Spanish nationality? An individual with documented antecedents of collaboration with Hamas — operative number 25 of the PCPA according to documents captured in Gaza and published by Israel — holds a Spanish passport and operates freely from Spain. No one has explained the naturalization process or whether the security services were aware of his background.
2. Why has the Government not investigated Cyber Neptune? Cyber Neptune SL (CIF B22434260, based in Barcelona) was transferred to Abu Keshek on August 22, 2025 — nine days before the flotilla’s departure — and changed its corporate purpose from real estate to maritime transport. Documents captured by the IDF in Gaza, whose authenticity matches the format and language of official Hamas communiqués, identify the company as the front owner of dozens of the Sumud flotilla boats. Israel’s Ministry of Defense designated the PCPA, the organization of which Abu Keshek is a member of the General Secretariat, as an “institution established by Hamas” in August 2021. Cyber Neptune continues to operate in Spain without any investigation by the authorities. Anti-money laundering regulations require banks to justify the origin of funds in multi-million transactions. Which bank processed this company’s operations? Who authorized them?
3. Why has the Ministry of the Interior not opened an investigation? The 2025 and 2026 flotillas included individuals with final convictions for terrorism linked to ETA. José Javier Oses (2026 flotilla) served eight years in prison in France for belonging to ETA. Itziar Moreno (2025 flotilla) was sentenced to 15 years for shooting and wounding a French gendarme. Their participation in operations organized by a network sanctioned by the US Treasury has generated no response from the Ministry of the Interior. The question is not rhetorical: it is a legal obligation.
4. Why did the Government pressure for the release of Abu Keshek? Minister Albares exerted diplomatic pressure to secure the release of an individual legally detained in the exercise of international naval law. This is not foreign policy: it is ideological subordination that compromises Spain’s credibility as a reliable partner in the fight against terrorism.

The ETA-PFLP connection is not history. It is the precedent of a pattern that repeats today under different names. International terrorism feeds on itself, shares techniques and structures, and seeks the complicity of weak or ideologically aligned states.

SOURCES AND DOCUMENTATION

● PFLP training of ETA in Yemen (1980) · Florencio Domínguez, “ETA: Organizational Strategy and Actions 1978–1992” · Doctoral thesis, UPV-EHU
● PFLP episodes in Spain (1975, 1982) · Gaizka Fernández-Soldevilla, “Terrorism in Spain”
● PFLP in Madrid demonstration (January 2024) · Vozpópuli · 30/01/2024
● Terrorist designation of the PFLP · EU: Regulation CE 2580/2001 · US: OFAC · Canada: Public Safety Canada
● Samidoun visit to the PFLP in Lebanon (July 2021) · Terrorist designation: OFAC; Public Safety Canada · Outlawed in Germany: Bundesministerium des Innern, October 2023
● ETA “detainees’ manual” · Seized in operation against the Araba commando (1998) · Judicial summary of Gestoras Pro Amnistía
● OFAC sanction on Saif Abu Keshek · U.S. Department of the Treasury · 19/05/2026
● Cyber Neptune SL (CIF B22434260) · Spanish Commercial Registry · Transfer to Abu Keshek: 22/08/2025
● Hamas documents on the PCPA and Abu Keshek · Israel Defense Forces (IDF) · September 2025
● Designation of the PCPA as a Hamas organization · Israel Ministry of Defense · August 2021
● José Javier Oses and Itziar Moreno (ETA convictions in 2026 and 2025 flotillas) · EFE Agency · 26/05/2026
● EU terrorist list · Common Position 2001/931/PESC of the Council · 27/12/2001
● Agreement not to renew ETA on the EU list · El Debate · 31/01/2026
● Hamas financing by Iran (100–200 million $/year) · U.S. Department of the Treasury · Washington Institute for Near East Policy
● Sumud flotilla 2025 fundraising (+4 million €, IAC) · OKDIARIO · May 2026
● Basque Government as largest European funder of Addameer · NGO Monitor · June 2025
● OFAC designation of Addameer · US Treasury · June 2025
● eLankidetza subsidy to Addameer (€150,000, 2021)
● Abu Keshek congressional appearance · Infobae · 13/05/2026
● Albares appearance · Infobae · 21/05/2026
● Statements by Bildu, Podemos and Sumar after Loiu · Cuba en Resumen · 24/05/2026

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